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Abstract — Banking crime is one of the widespread phenomena 
in 2016 are closely associated with the used of computer-based 
technology and internet networks that constantly evolving. One of 
them is the burglary of customer accounts through the internet 
banking facility. To overcome this, we need a method of how to 
detect a conspiracy of bank burglary case of customer accounts. 
The way to scalable is by get a mining decision to get a decision 
tree and from the decision tree to get a decision attribute value to 
determine the level of anomalies. Then of all the attributes decision 
point is calculated rate of fraud. The rate of fraud is classified 
through level of security of attack by the attacker then entropy 
gain is used to calculate the relative effort between the level of 
attacks in the decision tree. The results show that the method could 
classify three levels of attacks and the corresponding entropy 
gains. The paper uses decision trees algorithm, alpha++ and dotted 
chart analysis to analyze an attack that can be scalable. The results 
of the analysis show that the accuracy achieved by 0.87%.  
Keywords— security; bank; event logs; business process; fraud; 
dotted chart analysis; process mining; scalable. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cyber criminals can compromise networked systems by 
exploiting vulnerabilities, and such events impose a critical 
socioeconomic impact on enterprises and individuals [1]. An 
attack surface describes vulnerabilities that cyber criminals can 
exploit to penetrate through the networked system and so it is of 
paramount importance to secure the networked system by 
minimizing the attack surface (e.g., patching vulnerabilities). 
Security models, or also known as attack representation models 
(ARMs), are well-defined means of analyzing the security of 
networked systems in efforts to enhance the fundamental 
framework for network security [2]. These models can be used 
to analyze vulnerabilities in the networked system, and provide 
solutions to effectively manage them (e.g., network hardening). 
However, analyzing all possible attack paths using single-
layered graph-based ARMs has a scalability problem (e.g., an 
attack graph (AG). This is an emerging problem as network 
systems are becoming large, such as the Cloud [3].  
II. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. Conspiration 
Conspiration is the activity of secretly planning with other 
people to do something bad or illegal. A collaboration between 
people to do criminal or legal action but being forbidden to do a 
variety of actors. There are laws to deal with conspiracy in 
federal court cooperation only in violation of the law before the 
law. Conspiracy is a crime that is separate from the criminal act. 
Conspiracy is the preparation of criminal acts. Conspiracy form 
of solicitation is being made to engage in a criminal act. 
Conspiracy need an agreement between two or more people, 
while the solicitation can be done by one person alone [4]. 
Conspiracies can be called efforts. Efforts can be made by one 
person. The conspiracy existed before the crime actually carried 
out, no effort will succeed unless their efforts made. conspiracy 
in law is a separate substantive crime because when the person 
did criminal cooperation, the potential for increased criminal 
activity [5]. Therefore act with criminal intent agreement (in this 
case the real behavior) is considered quite dangerous. 
Conspiration is shown in Fig. 1. Colour label Green: describe 
dangerous person or mafia from cheater, Colour label Blue: 
describe people as a source of criminal data, Colour label pink: 
describe the intermediary cheater and Colour label orange: 
describe the most influential cheater. 
B. Defraud 
Encyclopedia of American Law explain that defraud is to 
make the wrong assumption of facts, making false or recklessly 
without regard to whether it is right or wrong, intending to make 
something be wrong and in a state in which the person is not 
responsible for its destruction [6]. Defraud is intended to deprive 
the property or benefit of any person in any case, real, or equal 
to fraud. Her intent means intent to deceive others, and to induce 
others like, dependence on such scams, consider, create, transfer, 
modify, or terminate the rights, obligations or powers with 
reference to the property [7].  
C. Event Logs 
The event log is a recording process in the form of 
transaction history or audit trail in an information system tools. 
Each system event log information definitely has evidence of 
ongoing transactions [8]. For example, only existing recording 
of the event logs on the Case Defrauding Conspiration of 
Customer Bank Account (see Fig.2). Event Log contains 
information about activities in the form of a case or a specific 
task [9]. The case itself is called the "process instance" is an 
ongoing activity. For example, the order to the supplier 
(purchasing), the order by the customer (customer order) and 
several other events. While the task is activity in the trace, could 
be stages of activity [10]. So the trace have many tasks. Event 
Log consists of several attributes including caseid, 
attributename, activity, user (originator) and time (timestamp) 
[11].
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Fig. 1. Illustration of Network of Defrauding Conspiracy of Bank Customer Accounts 
 
 
Fig. 2. Event Log .mxml for Case Defrauding Conspiration of Customer 
Bank Accounts 
D. Dotted Chart Analysis 
Dotted chart shows a visualization of an example of the 
process as colored dots on the schedule [12]. Whenever 
according to the specific event of the process being analyzed and 
each one colored dot on the timeline sequence corresponding to 
 
Fig. 3. Graph of Entropy Algorithm 
a special event to process. Color dot shows the events that 
occurred and the location of the point on the timeline is the time 
when it occurred (see Fig. 3). It indicates the level of difficulty 
dotted chart analysis contains information on all the cases 
recorded. for example, there is no possibility to determine the 
points that show the different events on the same model elements 
(eg, movement, change the name of special activities, creation) 
and did not investigate the technical attributes of the event log 
(ie, leaves no plug-ins). for it is some event log can be one focus 
for each (one for each sample) [13]. part of the event in the event 
log can then be grouped per model element. The dotted lines take 
an event log as input. it can be concluded that the dotted Chart 
can be used as a visual study of Parts Per Millions. 
E. Decision Tree Classification 
Decision tree is how to establish a regression model or 
classification in such a tree structure visualization [14].
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It can create a set of data into smaller sections of tree-related 
decisions that gradually developed in the same time [15] 
[16][17][18][19][20]. The end result of the decision tree is a 
tree with leaf nodes and nodes decisions.  
 Leaf node is a classification and decision. On this tree 
node section in accordance with the best prediction is called 
the root node. A decision tree can handle data both in 
numerical and categorical. Basic algorithm to construct a 
decision tree is ID3 (Iterative Dichotomiser 3) by J. R. 
Quinlan with a topdown, greedy search through the space 
without the possibility of backward branch. ID3 using 
Information Gain and Entropy to build a decision tree. A 
decision tree is built by using a top-down from the root node 
and involves partitioning the data into subsets that contain 
samples with the same value (homogeneous). ID3 algorithm 
in (1) is used to calculate the entropy of the homogeneity of 
the sample (see Fig. 4). That variable of ݌݅ is meaning 
Probability. If different sample then homogenized entropy 
value is zero and if the value of entropy is one then the sample 
was equally divided. 
ܧሺܵሻ = ∑ ݌௜	݈݋݃ଶ	݌௜௖௜ୀଵ            (1) 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
A. Data Source 
The data obtained by the authors is the data of the 
conspiration system in the form of defrauding customer bank 
accounts activity performed and data properties bank 
employees like in the Table I and then extracted to be .mxml 
format. The data in .mxml format consists of several data 
containing: 
1. Case_id: contains user id procurement had been forged. 
2. Activity_name: contains the name of the activity that has 
been performed. 
3. Time_stamp: contains the date and start time activity. 
4. Originator: contains resources that do activities. 
5. Attribute_name: contain properties or data of activities. 
B. Procedure Research 
The procedures in this research starting from data 
collection event log from modelling simulation data in Tool 
Named YAWL that can see in Fig. 5. And then extraxted to 
be .xes and then extracted again to be .mxml format. Then use 
the .mxml formatted log event data to analysis with dotted 
chart analysis, decision point analysis and conformance 
checker using library in ProM that dotted chart analysis use 
for get decision atributed in each case. After that, calculate the 
value of entropy and information gain to calculate a rate of 
fraud (see Table. II) and using decision trees classification 
algorithm to find some rules and then make a structure of 
network conspiration that can be detect of scalable security. 
The formatted data in .mxml (can be seen Fig. 2). And then 
mining with ProM to look aoundness from yawl modelling to 
prom modelling (see Fig. 6). And then mining decision point 
analysis to find decicion trees of conspiration (see Fig. 7). And 
then minning dotted chart analysis to analysis distributed 
event in over time with dotted chart analysis. In dotted chart 
analysis that can be seen that brown circle is the succesful 
status with high amount and low amount attack or heavy 
attack. And other color circle is slight attack or failed status 
attack or conspiration (see Fig. 8).
 
TABLE I.  TABLE EVENT LOG BANK FINANCIAL CREDIT BUSINESS PROCESS 
Case
ID 
Policy 
Type 
Status
Call 
Content 
SMS PIN 
Amount 
Account 
Bank 
Total 
Money Amount TypeFM Status 
1 Normal CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheFirstInt
ermediary 100000000 Unknown Unknown 
Successful with 
High Amount 
2 Normal CantBeCalling Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Failed 
3 Normal CanBeCalling Null NotGiven Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Failed 
4 Normal CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheFirstInt
ermediary 50000000 Unknown Unknown 
Successful with 
Low Amount 
5 Normal CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheSecondI
ntermediary 100000000 Unknown Unknown 
Successful with 
High Amount 
6 Normal CanBeCalling Ganti Not Given Unknown Failed Unknown Unknown Failed 
7 Reguler CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheFirstInt
ermediary 100000000 DistantRelatives PublicNumbers 
Successful with 
High Amount 
8 Reguler CantBeCalling Null Unknown Unknown Unknown NearofKin PrivateNumbers Failed 
9 Reguler CanBeCalling Null NotGiven Unknown Unknown DistantRelatives PublicNumbers Failed 
10 Reguler CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheFirstInt
ermediary 100000000 NearofKin PrivateNumbers 
Successful with 
High Amount 
11 Reguler CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheSecondI
ntermediary 100000000 DistantRelatives PublicNumbers 
Successful with 
High Amount 
12 Reguler CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheFirstInt
ermediary 100000000 NearofKin PrivateNumbers 
Successful with 
High Amount 
13 Premium CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheFirstInt
ermediary 50000000 Unknown Unknown 
Successful with 
Low Amount 
14 Premium CantBeCalling Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Failed 
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TABLE II.  TABLE ACTUAL AND OBTAIN ACTIVITY 
Case 
ID 
Policy
Type 
Status
Call 
Content
SMS PIN 
Amount
Account
Bank 
Total
Money Amount 
Type
FM Amount Rating Status 
10 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 12 1.5 Successful with High Amount 
12 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 12 1.5 Successful with High Amount
11 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 10 1.25 Successful with High Amount
5 2 2 2 2 2 2 -2 -2 8 1 Successful with High Amount
7 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 8 1 Successful with High Amount
1 2 2 2 2 0 2 -2 -2 6 0.75 Successful with High Amount
17 -2 2 2 2 2 2 -2 -2 4 0.5 Successful with Low Amount 
4 2 2 -2 2 0 2 -2 -2 2 0.25 Successful with Low Amount
13 -2 2 2 2 0 2 -2 -2 2 0.25 Successful with Low Amount
16 -2 2 2 2 0 2 -2 -2 2 0.25 Successful with Low Amount
6 2 2 2 0 -2 0 -2 -2 0 0 Failed 
18 -2 2 2 2 0 0 -2 -2 0 0 Failed 
9 0 2 0 0 -2 -2 0 0 -2 -0.25 Failed 
3 2 2 0 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -4 -0.5 Failed 
8 0 -2 0 -2 -2 -2 2 2 -4 -0.5 Failed 
15 -2 2 0 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -8 -1 Failed 
2 2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -12 -1.5 Failed 
14 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -16 -2 Failed 
 
Fig. 4. Standard Operational Procedure Defrauding Conspiracy of Customer Bank Account (card replacement mode 3G to 4G card) 
 
Fig. 5. Decision Tree Results in Decision Point Analysis of Case Defrauding  
Case
ID 
Policy 
Type 
Status
Call 
Content 
SMS PIN 
Amount 
Account 
Bank 
Total 
Money Amount TypeFM Status 
15 Premium Unknown Null Not Given Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Failed 
16 Premium CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheFirstInt
ermediary 50000000 Unknown Unknown 
Successful with 
Low Amount 
17 Premium CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheSecondI
ntermediary 50000000 Unknown Unknown 
Successful with 
Low Amount 
18 Premium CanBeCalling Ganti Given 
TheFirstInt
ermediary Failed Unknown Unknown Failed 
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Fig. 6. Dotted Chart Analysis Defrauding Conspiracy of Case Customer Bank 
Account 
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
The experiments for this research is a defrauding 
conspiration of bank customer account data and process. This 
research using event log with 18 cases to determine which one 
is heavy attack and which one is slight attack.  This paper uses 
8 indicators or ways to detect attack of security scalable. The 
indicator i.e. PolicyType, StatusCall, ContentSMS, PIN, 
AmountAccountBank, TotalMoney, Amount, TypeFM and 
Status. First is Attribute value of Defrauding Conspiracy of 
Customer Bank Account (see Table. II). The Great Value Gain 
Then More Difficult For Thieves break into accounts, Small 
Value Gain Then The Easy thieves breaking into account, The 
Great Value Entropy then The Big Opportunity thief to break 
into accounts, Small Value Entropy So Small growing 
opportunities thief To break into an account. Attribute of each 
value of case defrauding conspiracy of customer bank account 
can be seen in Table. III: 
TABLE III.  ATTRIBUTE VALUE OF DEFRAUDING CONSPIRACY OF 
CUSTOMER BANK ACCOUNT  
PolicyType Scoring AmountAccountBank Scoring  
Normal 2 TheSecondIntermediary 2 
Reguler 0 TheFirstIntermediary 0 
Premium -2 Unknown -2 
StatusCall   TotalMoney   
CanBecalling 2 Successful high amount 2 
CantBecalling 0 Successful low amount 0 
Unknown -2 Failed -2 
ContentSMS   Amount   
Ganti 2 NearofKin 2 
Null 0 DistantRelatives 0 
Unknown -2 Unknown -2 
PIN   TypeFM   
Given 2 PrivateNumbers 2 
NotGiven 0 PublicNumbers 0 
Null -2 Unknown -2 
TABLE IV.  CALCULATE ENTROPYOF THE TARGET 
Status 
Successful Failed 
1 4 
Entropy(Status) 0.721928095 
 
 
TABLE V.  CALCULATE ENTROPY USE THE FREQUENCY TABLE OF 
TWO ATTRIBUTES 
  
Status 
Successful Failed 
Total 
Money 
Successful 10 0 
Failed 0 2 
Unknown 0 6 
Entropy 
(Status,TotalMoney) 0.388316669 
And then calculation of entropy and information gain for 
knowing information gain and entropy using two attributes of 
frequency table for each decision point is like Table IV and 
Table V: 
TABLE VI.  INFORMATION GAIN USING TWO ATTRIBUTES OF 
FREQUENCY TABLE 
InformationGain Value 
Gain (Status,Amount) 0.018310782 
Gain (Status,TypeFM) 0.018310782 
Gain (Status,PolicyType) 0.018310782 
Gain (Status,StatusCall) 0.225829531 
Gain (Status,AmountAccountBank) 0.492478806 
Gain (Status,ContentSMS) 0.557727779 
Gain (Status,Pin) 0.557727779 
Gain (Status,TotalMoney) 0.602759391 
TABLE VII.  ENTROPY USING TWO ATTRIBUTES OF FREQUENCY TABLE 
Entropy Value 
Entropy (Status,PolicyType) 0.972765278 
Entropy (Status,Amount) 0.972765278 
Entropy (Status,TypeFM) 0.972765278 
Entropy (Status,StatusCall) 0.765246528 
Entropy (Status,ContentSMS) 0.433348281 
Entropy (Status,Pin) 0.433348281 
Entropy (Status,AmountAccountBank) 0.498597254 
Entropy (Status,TotalMoney) 0.388316669 
TABLE VIII.  INFORMATION GAIN FOR  
Rule Attack Type Value 
Gain (Status,TotalMoney) Heavy Attack 0.333611426 
Gain (Status,StatusCall) Slight Attack 0.288579814 
Gain (Status, Pin) Slight Attack -0.043318433 
 
Fig. 7. Rules of Scalable Security Attack for slight and heavy attack 
 Based on Table. VI and Table. VII value of entropy and 
information gain, that value can be used for structuring 
decision trees, higher value is first brach and lower value is 
last brach. Decision trees for entropy and information gain 
that have been structured is like Fig. 10 The decision tree is 
simple modified to change to the conditions of the mapping 
of the root node to node per one leaf. Based on this case that 
make 33 rules with classification succesful with high amount 
and low amount or heavy attack is 8 rules and failed status or 
slight attack is 25 rules (see Fig. 9). 
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Fig. 8. Decision Treen Defrauding Conspiracy 
TABLE IX.  THE QUALITY OF ALPHA++ ALGORITHM 
Defrauding Conspiracy of 
Customer Bank Account 
using 
Fitness Precision Structure 
Alpha++ Algorithm 1 0.87 1 
V. CONCLUSION 
This experiment identifies 18 cases of Defrauding 
Conspiracy of Customer Bank Account. The results show that: 
a) six cases successfully attack achieving high amount status; 
b) four cases heavily attack achieving low amount status; and 
c) eight cases lightly attack failing defrauding status. There is 
33 rules consisting 8 rules for heavy attacks and 25 rules for 
light attacks. This paper concludes that the accuracy of the 
experiment by using Alpha++ is 0.87%. 
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